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ABSTRACT
A listing of references concerning matters related to
incentive contracting is presented with brief annotations
and content codes.
Introduction
This bibliography includes a variety of treatments of
incentive contracts and contracting phenomena that range from
the normative to the empirical. It emphasizes work that has
appeared since 1961, but does include references to signifi-
cant eariler wor^s. Some citactona or work not concemeu
explicitly with incentive contracts or contracting ere inclu-
ded because of their broad relevance to certain genera), pro-
blems involved in the use of incentives.
The items included in the bib'iography are not necessarily
warranted .is exhaustive. However, the list undoubtedly appro-
ches completeness, at least for the period covered. At any
rate, it very probably includes the mosr significant pertinent
works and, at a minimum, constitutes a useful guide to the
modern literature.
In addition to brief annotation for the convenience of the
reader, each item in the bibliography is classified in two
ways: First grossly according to its principal content into
one of six categories, expressed as section headings, and,
secondly, according to a bibliographic key, into one or more
finer categories reflecting £he particulars of its contents.
Following each bibliographic entry is a series of index numbers
that refer to the array of descriptors used for this purpose.
These hav. been.grouped into 12 general categories and refer-
ence to the key displayed in Table 1. will permit decoding of
the numerical index numbers. Thus, in addition to information
about an Item's contents conveyed by the annotation, further
information is communicated by the numerical index code.
Table 1
Bibliographic
T. Motivation VII. Contracts,
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21
22
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25
26
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111
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General
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', Management
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General
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Commercial
51
52
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106 Math, model
107 Case studies
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109 Other
XI. Type of Article
111 Descriptive, non-«Rpirical
112 Discriptive, empirical
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116 Misc.
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121 Finance in Goneral
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125 Accountinp,
126 rfelfare econonicp ^ canpnrnble
economic systems
127 economics of the firm
Incentive Contracts: CcrterM grid
Arinc Research Corporation. System effectiveness management
course. Annopolls , Md.: ARC» 1966. (Defense Documentation
Center, AD 661-819).
Series of 7 lectures dealing with system effectiveness con-
cept for weapon acquisition. A very elementary discussion
of basic contract types is presented in lecture 4. (34,
61,72,73,108,113).
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to the evaluation of the performance of major development
contractors. Washington: DoD, August 1965. (Defense Docu-
mentation Center, AD 623-258).
A Description of rhe Defense program of contractor perform-
ance evaluation. Program intended to provide a long-term
incentive to contractors by creating within the government
a "memory" of their performance and a means for considering
their record in future actions relating to source selection.
(34,63,71,72,73,108,111).
Boston College Industrial & Corn-sereiaI Law Review. Defense
procurement -- a complex of conflicts snd tensions. 1963,
£ (No. I), 1-212.
A series of articles on defense procurement. Includes papers
on contract types, negotiated contracts, defaults, govern-
mental termination. (61,71,72,108,111).
Bracmcr, R. J. Recent developmeuts in government contract law.
Business Lawyer. 1967, .22, 1057-1073.
Brief survey of some recent changes in government contract
law. Includes: "certificate of current pricing," and new
procurement package (TPPC). (61,62,63,71,72,73,75,108,111).
IIncentive Contracts: General 4
Contract Management Institute. Incentive contracting tn the
aerospace Industry. Washington: Contract Management Insti-
tute, L965.
Basically a textbook for course In contracting, but includes
a more than usually thorough review of the history and theory
of incentive contracting, pointing up underlying assumptions.
Also reviews problems associated with CfTF contracts and
attempts some comparisons of outcomes among contract types.
(13,61,73,108,111).
Department of Defense. Incentive contracting guide 1965.
January 19, 1965. (Himeo).
Policies and procedures regarding incentive contracting.
Parallels NASA incentive contracting guide. (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965). New combined DoD/
NASA revision scheduled for early publication. (73,108,1.11).
Department of Defense. Logistics research conference. Vol. 2
Washington: OoD, 1965 (Defense Documentation Center, AD 623-
226).
Papers prepared for presentation to panel on procurement
practices. Content includes: flexible incentives; discussion
of cost-plus-award-fee contracts; proposed research on in-
centive contracting. (61,62,71,72,73,108,111,113).
Donnelly, J. R. Renegotiation and incentive profits in govern-
ment contracts. Hew York Stare Bar Journal. 1965, 37. 29-37.
A discussion of some of the pitfalls in the use of incentive
provioions. (71,73,103,113,125).
Durbin, E. P. Th»- contingent pricing problem: some considera-
tions in form! lacing quality incentives. Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1961.
Some of the factoro involved in formulating Incentive price
schedules were discussed. The primary point is that govern-
ment negotiators must allow for sampling variation and the
fact that contractors will consider expected results as well
as explicit payment schedules. Also points out that large
profits needed to have incentive effect. Develops linear
programming model to find optimal price function. (13,26,
r»c t mi
Incentive Contr ict s :
Enzer, H., & Del Linger, D. ('.. On some economic concepts of
multiple incentive contract Lnj;. Naval Kescarch Loy.isties
Quarterly. 1968, JJj, 47/-4S9.
Ur;'.cs j'.overnment to include !<>nr. run profits ami opportunity
costs in incentive arrangements. Multiple incentive con-
tracts should be also optimized in classes rather th.m indi-
vidual Ly. (23,21), 2b,r. 1,02,03. 71. 72. 73.7/it106,108.11 3,1 !•>,
124).
Farmer, W. A. Multiple incentive contracts: an analytical
technique. li-^ .A.. Management Account in^. 1908 (May), 49.
18-26.
An analytical mode 1 for evaluating multiple incentive con-
tract.",. Essentially, to evaluate likely performance, prob-
ability of achievement data must be added to basic cost-
perforroance-schedule incentive model, and the relationships
between that probability and incentive fees evaluated.
(71.72,73,114).
Fcdera 1 Bar JournaI. Symposium on government contracts. 1968,
£8, U9-280.
A series of articles dealing with: administrative resolution
of breaches; service contract developments; incentive contract
chaniv"; application of Freedom of Information Act to procure-
ment. (34,51,61,62,71,73,108,113).
Fray, L. L. , Briggs, W. G., Kusscll, J. R. Cost/effectiveness
and utility functions for incentive structures. Unpublished
paper MS-3745, Harbridge Mouse, 1966. (Defense Documentation
Center, AD 48'>-r>72).
Describes FlIM model as used for Gemini spacecraft. Gives a
method to make fee proportional to the government's utility
for schedule, perlormance, and cost combinations. (13,33,
72,73,108,11]).
Grflvallesc, A. J. An evaluation of the total package procurement
concept as exemplified by three Air Force weapon system con-
tracts. Unpublished master's thesis, Massachusetts institute
of Technology, 1968.
This study evaluates the TPPC by comparing its intended objec-
tives with the actual experiences of contractors and Air
Force utucuic.ucul uilx^ctj. (i3.«.'A,33,5i,52,61,62,71,72,73,
Inc'/ntivr (.ontr.'icts - General . h
Harbridf.o Hnusc Inc. Incentive Contracting. Boston: H«rhridj;e
House, 1967.
Primarily an introduction to methods of structuring incen-
tive toncracls. (73,108,111).
Harbridge House Inc. R«sic graphics for Incentive contracting.
Prepared for the Director of Procurement , National Aeronau-
tics an<-l Space Administration.
Methods for structuring incentive contracts nnd Incentive
rol.itions. (73,108,111).
S Un'-i f"o oolprt;
Management . 1%2 (July), 2_2, 54-57.
Provides 11 criteria for making contract selection. Sugges-
tions on how to size up the job and the capabilities of the
company, and choose the contract that delivers the greatest
reward. (14,71,73,108,113,121).
Jones, T. H., Jr. Centralized incentive teams for pre-award re-
view and analysis of incentive structure. Paper submitted
to Panel 9, Incentive Contracting DoD-Wide Procurement Pric-
ing Conference, Hershey, Pennoylvania.
Includes analyses of trade-off theory, complexity of incen-
tive formats, cost v.o. performance incentives, • tivation,
utilities of differing contract forms -- with especially
useful review of assumptions involved. (11,61,71,72,73,
74, 75, 108, III, 113, 121).
Law and Contemporary Problems. Government contracts: Part 1.
19*4, 29 (No. 1), 1-274.
A scries of articles on government contracts. Include papers
on defense procurement, the government contracting process,
contract disputes, conflict of Interests in federal procure-
ment. (61,71,72,73,107,112).
Law and Contemporary Prohlema. Government contracts: Part II.
I960, 29 (No. 2), 275-646."
A scries of articles on government contracts. Include papers
on government contracts; pricing policies; economy in govern-
ment contracting; exc.hianKe of technical data in government
R&D contracts, and independent R&D expenditures. (51,71,
72,73,75,10?,112,122).
Incentive Contracts - General
Logistics Management Institute. Value engineering •- final
report. Washington: LMI, May 1963. (Defense Documentation
Center, AD 659-511).
An evaluation of value engineering, covering methodology,
criteria, change procedures, level of effort, organization,
selection and incentives. (63,71,73,107,112).
Logistics Management Institute. Tabular model and procedure
for structuring multiple incentive contratrs. January 1964
it has been found necessary to devise a method for creating
a greater decree of Interdependence among the incentive ele-
ments (cost, time and performance) than has heretofore exis-
ted. This has been accomplished through the tabular model
by the uso of tebles which incorporate multipliers less than
one and greater than zero. (34,62,73,104).
Logistics Management Institute. Total package procurement con-
cept, synthesis of findings. Washington: LMI, June 1967.
(Defense Documentation Center, AD 655-314).
A review of the advantages and disadvantages of the total
package method of procurement. There is a greater need for
an integrated management information for TPP programs than
there is for development-only programs. On balance, the in-
fluential factors of cost, schedule, and system performance
in the TPP programs studied tend to support rather than con-
strain technical inr.ovr.tion. (33,61,71,72,73,107,113).
Logistics Management Institute. Incentives for achieving compo-
nent standardization in ship construction. Washington: LMI,
December 1967 (Defense Documentation Center, AD 665-680).
Suggests improvements, including increasing the amount of in-
centives, in the Navy system of giving profit incentives to
contractors who favor components for which spare parts sup-
port already exists. (13,61,62,73,107,113).
Inccntiv? Contracts - General
Logistics Management Institute. Information package on pro-
gress to date, ASHR Special Sub-Connit tee on Case No. 67-
253 "Modicatlon of weighted guidelines to give greater
recognition to Invested capital" Rovised June 15, 1968.
Paper describes "Weighted Guidelines" for allocating con-
tract profitability among capital equipment and working
capital. An Air Force *ask group is to empirically estab-
lish specific weights subsequently. The distinction based
on differences in risk. (73,106,103,111,124).
Logistics Management Institute. An examination of the founda-
tions of incentive contracting. 1968 (Mimeo/.
. (.uiuaea Ull ii'ie ci icti. Ciidi. Cuiiii-'aCi. ta 1 i t icci i—
tive arrangements may reasonably be expected to have in re-
duc.ing the cost, increasing the timeliness, and improving
the- performance of DoD programs. (!2, 13,61 ,62,71 ,73, 101,
107,113).
McDonald, P. R. Government prime contracts and subcontracts.
Glendora, Calif.: Procurement Associates, 1963.
A voluminous, regularly revised, practical iiov-to-do-it
guide to government procurement policies and procedures and
regulations. A thoroughly comprehensive compendium covering
all asoects of contracting and procureoent, plus marketing
background information. An excellent history of procurement
statutes and issues, government procurement organization and
description of distinctive NASA approaches. (31,41,61,71,
108,111).
Marcus, S. Studios of defense contracting. Harvard 5ustnpa»-
Review. 1964, (May-June), 42, 20-22ff.
Three recent ir.-d^pth reports, designed to inform both the
businessman and policy makers about the defense contracting
process and how it operates in practice, are reviewed. They
are: Arthur D. Little, Inc., How j_tc_k is t_he_ Defense Indus-
try?; Stanford Research Institute, The Industry-Government
Aerospace Relationship; M. J. Peck & F. M. Scherer, The Weap-
ons Acquisition Process. (61,62,63,64,71,72,73,74,75,103,
107,112,113.121,122,124,127).
Incentive Contracts - General
1'ilier, R. F. . A method for selecting contract cost incentives.
Defense- Documentation Center, 196?.
Presents an empirical method for evaluating the effect of
cost incentives on contractor efficiency, and determining
appropriate shoring proportions. (13,24,25,26,73,102,114).
i
Minsky, B. I, What effect will the incentive contracts have on
industry profit? Unpublished master's thesis. Boston: Boston
College, 1965.
Master's thesis outlining various contract types and trends
in government procurements. The paper attempts to flnsuer
the title question posed, but never does. However, a valu-
able section on the history of profits (reckoned by sales,
assets, and investments) in the defense industry is included.
(13,14,15,52,61,63,65,72,73,81,103,112,124).
Moss, R. S. Government contracts: nature, scope and types.
Boston Co 1 lego Industrial and Commercial Law Rev Jew . 1963,
5_, 21-42. " .
A discussion of the basic contract types, with a brief re-
view of the Armed Services Procurement Act «ind the Federal
Procurement Act. (71,72,73,108,111).
Nash, R. C. Incentive contracting. Government Contracts Mono-
graph No. 7. Government Contracts Program, George Washington
University, 1963.
Comprehensive review of background, concepts, applications,,
terms <md methods of incentive contracting. Includes brief
treatments of value engineering, CPAF formats and perfor-
mance rating systems. Advocates incentive methods. (34,
73,108,111,113).
Nash, R. C. Pricing pc-lcies in government contracts. Law and
Contemporary Problem. 1964. 29. 361-379.
An analysis of the techniques that are being used in the
pricing of voods and oervlces, the changes that have been
made in this area, and some of the possible results of cur-
rent pricing policies. - Effects of incentive contracts in
lieu of CPFF contracts. (61,62,71,72,73,103,111,121). .
Incrntive Contracts - Genera] 10
Nash, R. C., Jr. Incentive contracting. Federal Bar Journal.
1962, 22., 195-216.
Analyzes some of the incentive provisions most commonly in
use; isolates some of the problems involved in their use;
suggests some future possibilities for other types of in-
centive techniques. (71,72,73,108,111).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA incentive
contracting guide. (2nd Ed.) Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965.
Policies and procedures regarding incentive contracting.
Parallels Department of Defense Incentive contracting guide
(Office of Assistant: Secretary o- Defense, I&L, 1965). New
combined DoD/NASA revision scheduled for early publication.
(73,108,111).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Procurement
Office operating procedure. No, 51-6. Washington: NASA
Headquarters, June 28, 1967.
•
The operating procedure of the Procurement Office is pre-
sented. Primary policy and procedural responsibilities are
listed. The listing is arranged by topical headings for
parts, subparts, and paragraphs of the NASA PR (NPC 400).
(31,42,61,62,63,71,72,73,74,108,111).
Parry, E. F. The changes clause in incentive contracting.
Federal Bar Journal. 1968, 28. 256-270.
A "down to earth:l review of the problems of changes associated
with the CPTF contract. A discussion of: some of the limita-
tions of existing clauses in handling the dynamics of CPIF
contracts; the fact that the present clause language falls
considerably short of giving the government the changes flex-
ibility it realistically needs in a CPIF contract enviorn-
ment; fee adjustment approaches. (71,72,73,108,111).
Incentive ^~T,-.j-acts - General II
Poa';, M.irwlck, Livingston & Co. A report on contract defini-
tion. A report prepared for Office of the Director of De-
fense Research and Engineering. Boston: Peat, Marwick,
Livingston & Co., January 2, 1967. (Defense Documentation
Center, AD 646-240).
T'uis report provides a better understanding of the intent of
DoD policy in DoD directive 3200.9, "Initiation of Engineer-
ing and Operational Systems Development." Covers the
rationale for the policy; some of the major problems that
have occurred during the implementation of the directive;
and possible means of alleviating these problems. (61,71,
72,73,107).
roncone, j. j. present incentive contract guidelines -•• some
clarifying remarks. Paper presented at the 1965 Management
Conference Course, sponsored by the North Alabama Chapter,
American Institute of Industrial Engineers, Huntsvilie,
Alabama, October 19, 1966.
A clarification of some present incentive contract guide-
lines. (71,73,108,111).
Reaph, J. V., Jr. Developments in government contract law.
Business Lawyer. 1964, .19, 831-843.
A description of some recent developments in government con-
tract law. Includes a section on "weighted guidelines on
profit." (15,71,72,108,111,124).
Rowlands, J. J. Formula elements of Incentive contracts. .N.A.A.
Management Accounting, 1967 (April), 48. 30-37.
A discussion of two basic types of incentive contracts — FPI
and CPIF contracts. Examples and graphs are used to illus-
trate the mechanisms of the sharing agreement. (71,73,108,111),
Scherer, F. M. The theory of contractual incentives for cost
reduction. Quarterly Journa1 of Economics. 1964, 78, 257-280.
Presents a theory relating contractor behavior to cost shar-
ing arrangements. The contractor is considered to maximize
profits that include the long range effects, called user
costs, that occur as a consequence of cost reduction efforts.
(13,71,72,73,108,115,127).
Incentive Contracts - General \2
Smith, N. I!. Procurement: Multiple incentive contract inn,
scientific contracting with .-iccent on trr.de-off. St. Louis,
Mo.: Army Aviation Material Command, May 19b7. (Defense
Documentation Center, AD 653-643).
Incentive contracts, in which the seller is rewarded (or
penalized) according to performance achieved, can work to
the advantage of the seller or the buyer, to both, or to
neither. The report emphasizes the need for a method of
analysis of incentive arrangements so .that the true influ-
ence on foe earned may be known in advance of negotiation
or signing of a contract. (61,71,73,76,108,113,121).
inran, K. H. A note on incentive ree contracting. Sanca
Mon'ira, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1965.
This note indicates some of the difficulties which arise when
the incentive fee concept is applied to subcontractors. (73,
108,112).
|Trueger, P. M. Profit guidelines on defense contracts. Journal
; of Accountancy. (January, 1964), pp. 44-48.
' A discussion of the changes in DoD policies and procedures
on contract profits. (15,71,108,111,125).
Turpin, C. C. Government contracts: A study of methods of
contracting. Modern Law Review. 1968, 31. 241-256.
An examination of the principal types 01 contracts used by
the British and U.S. govtcnments in the procurement of goods
and services. Discusses the 'emergence of special devices
and techniques in contractir.», of which the function is to
safeguard the public interest while assuring adequate reward
for the contractor. (34,51,61,71,72,73.108,111).
Vecchietti, C. J. The contractual effect of the unexpected.
Remarks made at the Electronic Industries Association Annual
Meeting, Government Procurement Relations Department, Santa
Barbara, California, November 16, 1967.
Concerned with matters of choosing contract formats, contract
definition and change, and risk and sharing thereof. (24,
71,72,73,74,108,111,121').
Incentive Contracts - General 13
Wciner, N. S. Multiple incentive fee maximization: An eco-
nomic model. Quarterly Journa1 of Economics. 1963, 77,
603-616.
Post negotiation tradeoffs by the contractor are only partly
affected by fee ptrarwters of the contract. Other contracts,
future profits, and renegotiation may be more important.
(13.61,71,73,108,111,115,127).
Organizational Processes: Management, Negotiation, Admi n i s tr a t ion
Bickner, R. E. A review of The Weapons Acquisition Process; __ .
Economic Incentives . by Fredpr>-~ M,. S;.u.c»ci . -S.'inca Monica,
: Kmid corporation, 1964.
A review of Scherer's book. (13,61).
Carlisle, H. M. Incentive contracts: .Management strategy of the
Department of Defense. Public Administration Review. 1964,
24, 21-28.
Argues for improved measures of program performance and costs.
Unless these improvements are developed, the relations be-
tween aerospace firms and the federal agencies will .deterior-'
ate and the potential cost-effectiveness program gains offered
by incentive contracts will be lost. (34,63,71,73,108,111).
Cravens, .1. E. Whether a single, high level professional group
should assume responsibility for negotiation of significant,
complex systems contracts. Paper presented at the Do D- Wide
1967 Procurement Pricing Conference, Hetshey, Pennsylvania,
October 30, 1967.
.Hew to make government negotiation more effective, bolstering
government's position; discussion of power; discussion of per-
formance evaluation and processes of negotiation. (23,25,
34,108,111).
Cravens, J. E. A reexamination of profit and incentive proce-
dures. Paper presented at the Aerospace Industries Associa-
tion Material Management Committee, Cape Kennedy, Florida,
June 6, 1968.
Reviews problems of risk and profitability in relation to
procurement and contracting policies and methods. Considers
problems of definition and computation of profit, especially
in reference to return on investment and CPAF contracts.
(13.15,61,72,73,108,113,124). - - - - - - -
Organizational Processes 14
D.inliof, C. H. Government contracting and technological
change. Washington, D. C.t Brookings Institution, 1968.
This study covers: the growth of the contractual system
in the scientific and technological areas; the government's
organization and procedures for managing the contractual
I system; the impact of the government's system upon the par-
ticipating private institutions; th? broader implications
of the system. The chief criticisms of Che system are con-
, sidered and continuing problems are identified. (31,32,
I 33,34,51,52,61,62,63,71,72,73,74,81,91,127).
Garretson, R. C. The contract _as a management tool. Paper
presented at the XV International Meeting -,f the "institute
of Management Sciences, Cleveland, Ohio. September 13, 1968.
In order for procurement officials to reduce their
pation in the internal management of a contractor, and yet
be able to meet or adjust the needs of the total defense pro-
gram, a system of continual performance measurement is needed,
It is suggested that it is a wasteful duplication to have the
contractor use one measurement system for his management, and
PERT for the government. (33,61,63,71,108,113).
George Washington Law Review. Administration by contract: An
examination of governmental contract ing-out. 19^3, 31 (No.
4), 683-880.
A series of articles on governmentcl contracting out. In-
cludes papers on the expanding role of contract in the ad-
ministration of R6J) programs, and contractual problems in
contracting out. (51,61,62,63,71, 72,108, III) .
Glennan, T. K. Some suggested changes in R&D strategy and
their implications for contracting. Sant? Monica, Calif.:
Rand Corporation, 1963,
Some suggestions for possible changes in the R&D process,
based on a number of studies of Air Force development pro-
jects. The necessary changes in military contracting pro-
cedures are covered, with special attention to prototype
developments. (51,52,61,71,108,113).
Organization.! I Processes IS
Cuhin, K. K. Financing defense contracts. Law and Contem-
porary Problems. 1966, 29, -'.38-452.
The article places In perspective, for the newcomer, the
position of the federal government in the financing of de-
fense contracts. Largely based on the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulation (ASPR), titled Appendix E, "Defense
Contract Financing Regulations." (33,71,108,111,122).
Hall, G. R. Defense procurement and public utility reflation.
Santa Monica, Calif.: Hand Corporation, 1967.
Instead of seeking procurement systems improvements through
increased regulation, It is preferable to seek more oppor-
tunities to obtain market generated information. (13,61,
6^,6j,/i,/2,73,7«*f/3, 106, i i.j,
Hall, G. R., & Johnson, R. E. A review of Air Force procure-
ment, 1962-1964. 1965 (Defense Documentation Center, AD
615-655).
A study of Air Forc«» procurement. There are three goals to
the study: to develop a framework for a quantitative des-
cription of procurement, to describe recent trends in Air
Force procurement, and to describe what the Air Force pur-
chased, using what kinds of contracts. (61,71,72,73,103,
107,112).
Heyman, V. K. Contractual problems in contracting out. George
Washington Law Review. 1963, .31, 768-783.
Focuses on the major problems associated with CPFF contract-
ing. Problems include: incentives; overhead and reimbur-
sable costs; salary end fringe benefit limitations; proprie-
tary information and patents; fees; and subcontracting rights.
(71,72,73,108,111).
Hunt, R. G. Innovation and invention: Research and development,
social utility and public policy. Address, University of
Montana, December 11, 1968.
Reviews private and federal R&D expenditures and their results,
Discusses need for policy-based redirection of national re-
source allocation and proposes extensive employment of admin-
istrative contracts to achieve productive government- industry
collaboration. (5! ,52,54,61,63,64,108, 113, 122,126).
Orgcnizational Processes lf>
John, D. B. Some problems of cost-plus contracts. Public
Administration Keview. 1959, _l£, 219-226.
An analysis of many of the problems of cost-type contract-
llig -- some not easily anticipated by the novice -- as well
PS some conclusions about its efficiency. (34,VI,108,111,
121).
• i •
;.
Johnson, .). A. The expanding role of contract in the adminis-
' tration of research and development programs. George Washing-
' ton Lnu Rcvtrw. 1963, M.. 747-767.
A historical view of the contracting process-" by the govern-
71,107,112).
Johnson, R. E. Research in procurement. Santa Monica, Calif.:
Rand Corporation. (Mimeo).
Covers importance of R&D, competition, justifications of
negotiated procurement, "fair" pricing-incentives. (22,51,
61,62,73,75,81,108,111).
Kennedy, J. J. Description and analysis of the organization of.
the firm in the defense weapon contract industry. Ann Arbor,
Mich.: University of Microfilms, 1962. No. 63-4673.
A study of the organization of the defense weapon contract
industry. Some hypotheses pertaining to the basi~ organiza-
tional functions and subfuncticns were developed through
workshops with experienced defense personnel, on-slte analy-
sis of twelve defense weapon contractors, and interviews
with key department of defense and industry personnel. Data
pertaining to these hypotheses were gathered by a questionnaire
submitted to the defense weapon contract industry. (31,61,
101,102,112).
Keyes, W. N. The responsibility of a government cost-type con-
tractor. FederaI Bar Journal. 1962, 2£, 68-91.
An examination of a cost-type contractor's legal responsibility,
which is affected by written and unwritten provisions appli-
cable to cost-type contracts. (71,108,111).
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Kornreich, D. B. fc Schwartz, R. S. The new "law" of govern-
ment service contracts. Federal Bar Joyrnaj.. 1968, 28.
239-255.
An in-depth treatment of the elements which the "Coddard
Opinion" states will be used in determining whether ser-
vice contracts are violating federal personnel laws.
Critiques this aspect of the Coddard Opinion regarding
government contract law. (71,108,111).
Logistics Manageu>ent Institute. Weighted guidelines changes
and other proposals for incentives for contractor acquisition
of facilities. September, 1967 (Defense Documentation On-
Includes statement of DoD position regarding profit motiva-
tion, review of policy and previous studies regarding in-
centives for capital investment (with extensive bibliography),
some discussion of general motivations of profit in invest-
ment and determinations of profit (competitive vs. negotia-
tion). (13,61,73,108,113,121,122,124,125,127).
Logistics Management Institute. Defense industry profit review:
LMI Task 66-25, Vols. 1 & 2. Washington, D. C.: Logistics
Management Institute, November 1967.
The study endeavors to measure profit trends by size of com-
pany and type of contract and to compare trends on both de-
fense and commercial business. The 1st volume concentrates
primarily on findings and conclusions resulting from the
LMi's study, and the 2nd volume is a supplement to this docu-
ment, containing supporting data. (15,71,101,103,112,121,
122,124).
Marks, L., Jr. Industry versus DoD.control of programs and the
impact on management prerogatives. Paper presented at the
National Securit- Industrial Association Procurement Sympo-
sium, Washington, D. C., September 27, 1967. (Mimeo).
Covers matters of: Management systems and cost control; com-
petition and DoD-contractor relations; performance evaluation.
(33,34,63,71,81,108,111).
Organizational Processes 18
McCflll, J. J. An analysis of military procurc-inent policies. •
Santa Monica, Calif.: Hand Corporation, 196'*.
Economic analysis of 3 contract types: fixed price, 'fixed-
price incentive1, and cost-plus-fixeil-fee. Presents in
economic model of the procurement process. Suggests that
contractors bias cost estimates to maximize profits, making
it difficult to distinguish between high and low cost firms
on the basis of hlaa or target costs. (61,106,113).
Miles, M. Defense profits: are they declining or rising? Nrw
Republic. 1968, 1^9. 19-21.
Reviews controversial figures concerning defense Industry
profits and problems of negotiated procurement and the
"contract state." (15,61,64,71,74,108,111).
Military Law Review. Symposium on procurement law. October,
1962.
A series of articles on procurement law. Includes papers
on judicial and non-judicial remedies of a government con-
tractor, government contracts, bid guarantees, defense sub-
contracting programs, and the new defense programming con-
cept. (61,62,71,72,108,111).
Moore, F, T. Military procurement and contracting: an economic
analysis. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1962.
A survey of problems of economic efficiency in military pro-
curement and contracting. Background material on contracts
presented. The increasing share of procurement by cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts is noted and a reclassification of con-
tract types proposed. (61,71,108,111,121).
Moore, R. 0. Efficiency and public policy in defense procure-
ment. Law and Contemporary Problems, 1964, 29. 3-18.
A discussion of the relative efficiency of the procurement
process and means for improving it. Considers: the struc-
tural character-sties of the market and competition; firm
behavior and market results; sume Implications of these fac-
tors for changes in public policy In defense procurement.
Compares CPFF and CPIF contracts. (22,34,41,63,72,73,108,
112,127).
IV
N.ish, II. (.., Jr., I'.Cihinlc .1., .lr. Government contract
:H| mini sir.it ion. Government Contracts Program. George
Washington University, 1%5.
A1 discussion of the various types of modifications that
tnke place during contract performance. Deals with claims
hy contr.icrors against the Government arising out of orders
or nets of tho Government which alter the contractor's
work or method of accomplishing the work and hvnce increase
his costs. Provides a thorough understanding of the rights
of the parties when such actions of the Government occur.
(71,108,111).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Management --
A continuing literature survey, with indexes, 1962-1967.
Washington, D. C. May J.968 (NAS-V-SP-7500/02/).
A literature survey dealing with the following topics:
Bibliographies, management, abstracts, contracts, economics,
indexes (documentation), personnel, research. (31,51,71,
81,108,111,121,125,127).
Nleburg, II. L. In the name oj[ science. Chicago: Quadrangle,
1966.
A controversial, provocative discussion of government
contr.T-cing and science policy focused on relations within
the "scientifIc-military-industriai complex" and centering
on issues relating to R&D contracting, the evolution of the
"contract state" and broad implications for American society.
(:1,31,51,71,91,103,113,124).
Office of the White House Press Secretary. Report to the Presi-
dent on government contracting for research and development,
April 30, 1962.
A review of the use of government contracts with private in~
stltutions and enterprises to obtain scientific and technical
work needed for public purposes. The topics include: cri-
teria for deciding whether to contract out research and dev-
elopment work; improving policies and practices applying to
R&D contracting; avoiding possible conflicts of interest by
contractors; and improving the government's ability to carry
out K&l) work directly. (51,71,73,108,113).
Organizational ProceHses 20
Orkand, D. S. Some techniques for the statistical
of incentive contracts. . (Doctoral dissert nt ion, New Y<>rk
University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Microfilms,
1963, No. 65-23.
' r
The paper attempts to explain the nature and scope of In-
centive contracting, and to define the problems of statis-
tical management . It summarizes some techniques previously
developed for network planning and analysis. It Ind'^ates
the utility of these techniques and some applications .o
the formulation and management of incentive contracts.
(33,73,75,106,113,125).
Peck, M. J., & Scherer, F. M. The weapons acquisition process;
an economic analysis. Boston: Harvard University, 1962.
«n econo-.r.ic analysts 1.1 presented ot the weapons acnuisition
process. It includes a discussion of the nonnsrket character
of the process, the structure of the industry, aiu? the eco-
nomic criteria nnd relationships In the execution of weapons
programs. The core of the research material for this volume
was a scries cf case studies, seven involving advanced com-
mercial products and twelve involving advanced weapons --
aircraft and missiles. (61,81,91,102,103,107,112.122,127).
Ramey, J. T. Economy in government contracting -- Atomic Energy
Commission. Law arid Contemporary Problems. 1964, 29. 330-389.
An examination of the experience of the AEC with reg«,rd to
econorr' in contracting, especially with regard to the use of
the various forms and methods of contracting. (71,72,73,103,
112,125).
Scherer, F. M. The weapons acquisition process: economic incen-
tives. Boston: Harvard University, 1964.
This major volume focuses on contractual and competitive in-
centives in the development and production of major weapon
systems. (13,61,71,102,103,107,112,113,122,127).
Seagle, J. P. Risk aversion in contract negotiation. Bui let to
of the Institute of Management Science. 1968, j/>, 147-148
(Abstract).
Studies the phenomenon of risk aversion in contract negotia-
tion between government agencies and private firms. The
study proposes to measure tho cost to the buyer of passing
risk to a contractor. (24,71,73,106,112).
Organizational Processes 21
Seagle, J. P. A method for the study of risk aversion from
incentive contract negotiations. Technical report No. I,
October 1968 (Mimeo).
A study of the risk taking characteristics of negotiators
and business organizations. Data were obtained from several
contract negotiations, between government agencies ar.d pri-
;vate firms, during which both shading arrangements and ex-
,pected profits varied among the offers and counteroffers
reported. Estimates of a measure of risk aversion were made
from these data. (13,24,26,61,62,74,75,103,106,112,113,
114).
Seamans, R. C. Untitled. Speech given at G.W.U./F.B.A. Insti-
tute on Government Contracts. Washington. D. C.: May 5. 1967.
Covers: technological change and nee-j to develop suitable
management techniques; function of contracts (contracts as
relationship definers); dynamic nature (incentives and af-
fects of incentive contracts); project planning and outline
oi" procurement process. (61,31,71,72,73,108,111).
Speckj W. H. Assuring government contract performance. George
Washington Law Review. 1966, 34. 666-692.
Focuses on the means available of assuring, to the government
full contract performance. Deals with fixed price contracts
awarded competitively — what weapon the contracting officer
has available in his arsenal to assure performance, how ef-
fective these will be, and what defenses he must anticipate.
(34,71,72,108,113).
Stccle, E. R. A recipe for the development of complex systems.
Johnsville, Pa.: Naval Air Development Center, June 1959.
(Defense Documentation Center, AD 653-710).
The engineering report technique is clearly applicalbe to
military cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, and most of the fea-
tures are pertinent to any development contract. (71,72,
73,108,113).
Whelan, J. W., & Phillips, J. T. Government contracts: Emphasis
on government. Law and Contemporary Problems. 1964, 29. 315-
346.
Suggests that in studying the contracts of the federal gov-
ernment, wo are really studying government, government insti-
tutions, nnd public policies as much as agreement nnd con-
tracts. (22,31,41,51,61,71,108,111).
Orjvniz.it ional Processes 22
Whir taker, P. N. Remarks by Philip N. Whittaker at Defense-
Weapon Systems Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, July 12, 1967.
A very comprehensive and useful paper. Includes a review
of defense procurement history since Civil War, general
review of characteristics of defense industry, effects of
specialization,' TPPC, lack of control of market fate, prime
vs. sub-contracting, cooperation and competition in indus-
try, motivation for contracting, negotiation, attitudes
toward incentives; profit, risk, R&D. (12,13,15,24,33,
34,51,52,61,62,63,64,71,74,81,91,103,111, 121,124).
Contract /r
Devcjian, A. G. Post-period adjustments peculiar to CPFF con-
tracts. N,A.A. Bulletin. 1961 (January), 4j?, 77-86.
Variances between costs billed at predetermined provisional
billing rates for the prompt reimbursements and costs com-
puted on the basis of the final ne£Ptla:ed rate call for
adjustments of under or over-recovered costs. The procedure
applied for this, as described by the author, is deemed neces-
sary in order to arrive at figures which would truly reflect
the result of the operation. (71,75,125).
Flanagan, R. M. Fixed-price contracts may reduce return on in.'
vestment. N.A.A. Bulletin. 1961 (January), 42, 63-70.
profitwise a fixed-price contract may appear advantageous,
yet it often results in a lower return on investment ';han
could have been enrned under a cost-plus contract. Compa: a-
Cive evaluation given in the article also brings out key
variables which povern profitability. (15,71,122,124).
Gilfoy, W. M. Investment control tn fixed price defense con-
tracting. N.A.A_. Management Accounting. 1967 (April), 48.
38-42.
A discussion of some considerations which most directly affect
the investment of the defense contractor under a fixed price
contract. (63,71,122).
Contract Accounting 23
Huggins, E. V. Pitfalls in government contracts. Credit find
Financial Mnnngement. 1962, 64, 14-l5ft.
Comments on the financial problems and pitfalls of military
work. (62,63,71,121).
Rautio, A. A. Reminders on cost-type government contracts.
N.A.A. Bulletin. 1961, (October), 43, 86.
A few specific suggestions are outlined tor industrial accoun-
tants which will avoid problems whea the government auditors
call, upon completion of the contrast. (71,125).
Wenholz. C. R. Keeping track of performance on fixed-orice
incentive contracts. !*.£.£. Bu lie tin. 1963 (August), 44
^ "* *\ O 'i i-28.
A discussion of the problems involved in determining the mcst
realistic sales and costs for fixed-price incentive and other
types of contracts. A procedure is described for recording
••»nd verifying these values in the accounting records during
end at the end of contracts. (71,72,73,75,125).
Wright, H. W. A contract is a contract is a contract — or is
it? Financial Executive. 1965 (October), pp. 37-46.
The interpretation of applicable lass by the General Account-
ing Office, apparently based on thae agency's ciudit objectives
and desires, today threaten the validity and integrity of
government contracts. (33,34,71).
Public Reaction and News Media Reports
Aviation Week and Space Technology. House plan calls for accur-
ate cost data. I960 (June 20), .72, 75.
Legislation requiring defense contractors working on fixed
price incentive contracts to certify that their cost data
is accurate has been unanimously approved by the House Armed
Services Committee, headed by Rep. Carl Vinson. (25,61,71,
73,75).
Public Kc^ction and News Medici Reports
Aviation Week and Space Technology. Defense- proposes incentive
plan to cut CPFF contract volume. 1961 (June 26), 74. 31.
A plan is under consideration to have a board of experts
not directly involved in a contract determine how much pro-
fit or loss a contractor should get. The proposal for fee
determination met with some criticism, and also a counter-
proposal by P. E. Haggerty, president of Texas Instruments,
who suggested "price" orientation rather than "cost."
(33,34,71,72,73).
Aviation Week and Space Technology. Incentive contracts may
multiply controls. iVbJ (July 1}, 79, 93-99.
Greater use of incentive-type contracts is not likely to re-
duce government administrative controls on aerospace compan-
ies, and may in the long run tend to increase them. Contrac-
tor efforts will no doubt be stipulated to meet incentive
criteria, Erie Martin of United Aircraft Corp. believes, but
there is no evidence that government is sufficiently convin-
ced of this to relax any administrative cost controls.
(33,71,7?,73).
Aviation Week and Space Technology. Incentives prove useful, b'
no cure-all. 1964 (July 13), 81, 64.
Incentive-type contracts appear to have their intended bene-
ficial effect, hut they require njore careful negotiation and
are not suitable for all types of programs, according to re-
ports by industry and government spokesmen at the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics annual meeting and
the Aerospace Reliability and Maintainability Conference.
(33,71,72,73,74).
Aviation Week and Space Technology. USAF seeks tighter pre-
contract ing work. 1964 (October 26), JU, 71.
Air Force and industry must increase efforts in pre-contract-
ing phase of all procurements, as well as R&D work, to define
minutely performance, reliability, delivery schedules and
prices, according to Lt. Gen. T. P. Gerrity, USAF deputy chief
of staff for systems and logistics. (71,72,73,74).
Public Reaction and News Media Reports 25
i
Aviation Week and Space Technology. NASA tightens Marshall
contracts. 1964 (December 28^  tU, '{2.
Streamlining of contractor assignment procedures has begun
ar NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center with the selection of
16 aerospace firms for negotiations on support service prime
contracts. Cost-pl'js-incentlve-fec contracts will he renew-
able and are scheduled to go into effect, pending negotia-
tions, next March I. (33,71,72,73).
Aviation Week and Space Technology. Incentive has is set for
NAA Apollo work. 1965 (November 29), 83_, 79.
North American Aviation's contract^ for the Apollo command
•module and its escape system, service module and lunar ex-
cursion module adapter will be placed on an incentive basis.
R. A. Lambeth, treasurer and a senior vice president of the
company said he expects the shift to improve rather than
harm the company's earning. (15,33,71,72,73).
Aviation Week and Space Technology. NASA Tightening incentive
fee system. 1966 (August 15), 85, 150-153.
The "independent" multiple Incentive contracts of the past
few years are giving way to the "interdependent" contract.
The possibilities are illustrated with the Gemini project.
(61,71,72,73).
 >s
Aviation Week and Space Technology. $25.6-tr,illion Gemini incen-
tive seen for near-perfect effort. 1967. (January 16), 86. 32.
The Geraini CPFF arrangement was converted into a planned in-
terdependency incentive contract in 1964. NASA said that the
arrangement and the results from the Gemini program under it
"indicate almost total perfection." (71,72,73)
Backe, 3. Low fees may undermine incentive goal. Aviation Week
and Space Technology. 1965 (January II), £2, 69-72.
CPIF contracts, devised by the government to reward cost ef-
ficiency with higher profits, actually have a built-in tempta-
tion to many contractors to increase costs to the government
rather than decrease them. In practice, the contractor can
often earn more on an over-all basis by keeping the costs high,
even though it means a decrense in his fee. The reason for
this is to he found in the different viewpoints from which gov-
ernment and business look at costs and profits^ (15,71,72,73).
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B..nnerman, G. C. DoD nuide stresses incentive fee goals.
Aviation Week and Space Technology. 1965 (March I), U2_,
(.7-6*.
Comznents on the Backe article (Jan. II issue of AW5.S7) by
Deputy Assistant Secretory of Defense for Procurement and
essentially agrees. Some steps are being taken by DoD to
prevent serious damage to the Cost Reduction Program by
uncontrolled cost overruns under CPIF contracts. (33;34
63,71,72,73).
Blickstein, S. Buying influences: shifts in the offing?
nrmccrs: ink, ivou, inarch), ,£06, oo.
The advertising market could be affected by a broad change
over in government procurement methods from CPFF to incen-
tive-type contracts. Industrial advertisers and business
paper publishers are watching the projected change closely.
(42,63,71),
Business Week. For contractors, carrots and Ktlck. Jun.? 24,
1961, p. AO.
Defense Secretary KcNamara Is beginning to look with more
favor on higher profit allowances, but will crack dovn
harder than ever on contractors' costs. He is also taking
a sharper look at the high cost of technological changes in
weapons. (33,63,71,72,73).
Business Week. Pentagon moves away from cost-plus. March 24,
1962, p. 78.
i
'New procurement rules are designed to reward high-performance
contractor's and put penalties on those who do not perform
satisfactorily. (61,71,72,73)1
Business Week. Putting profit spur back into contract?. May 25
1963, P. 107.
The Pentagon is working on a way to systematize the £nce:ttlv*»
factor in its non-competitive procur^trint. Past'performance
will play an important part in this scheme. (22,34,61,63,73)
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Business U'eek . Management tightens its aerospace reins.
September 14, 1963, pp. 96-98.
Defense contractors are keenly aware of the change in con-
tract climate. The major defense companies are attempting
Co create a new approach to their work under the incentive
contract scheme. (31,34,73).
Chemical Week . New squeeze on subcontractors. 1965 (August
97. 24.
New government procurement practices are putting an indirect
squeeze on many chemical companies that have- small subcon-
tracted shares in DoD work. To the few chemical concerns
having major detense contracts, the new incentive program
is a mixed blessing. (62,63,71,73).
Crosby, R. W. U.S. uses government contracts fo put the screws
on industry. Iron Age. 1962 (December 6), 190, 74-7*>.
Companies who want contracts find U.S. government has ways
to bend them to its thinking on wage levels, hiring, and
profits. Restrictions in contracts arc one method, but there
are also other more subtle measures used. (33,63,71,72,73).
Engineering News-Record. Switch from cost-plus \.o fixed-price
could mean base price goes up $9.4 million. 1961 (January
19), 166. 21.
Conversion of a Navy construction contract with a joint ven-
ture of Brown-Raymond-Walsh from a cost-plus- fixed- fee to »
fixed-price basis "may have added as much as $9.4 million"
to costs for building military bases in Spain, said the
General Accounting Office. (71,72,73,121).
Gregory, W. H. Industry mixed on DoP'a profit system. Aviation
_Weck and Space Technology. 196> (September 2), 7,9. 60-b7.
Reaction to DoD's weighted guideline profit system, which
Incorporates Incentives and pest per fo nuance evaluation, is
partly elation within industry at the time of the basic
policy statement and partly ekepticiaa os to its translation
into reality. (15,34,63).
Public Reaction and News Media Reports 28
Industrial Research. (Washington Report) Incentive contr»ct
changes imminent. 1966 (October), 8, 35-36.
While NASA is doubling its use of incentives, and the DoD
is cutting back, both are closely scrutinizing their incen-
tive contracting methods and procedures and are studying
early incentive-type contracts now completed. The end re-
sults of these studies will produce new policies and proce-
dures that may mean greater rewards for we 11-executed con-
tracts. (61,71,72,73).
Johnson, K. House group ask procurement changes. Aviation
fcfccx artu Sj>«c_t' Te«:h»olo^ y. I?uO IT*"? *-'•*»• *'*» • IS-1 SI.
House Armed Services Committee, following a week of hear-
ings on military contracting highlighted by sharp criticism
of the incentive-type contracts used by Air Force and Navy,
has requested the General Accounting Office to draft new
defense procurement legislation. A number of recommendation?
were suggested. (61,62,73,122).
Johnsen K. Defense opposes bill to tighten incentive contract-
ing practices. Aviation W»ek and Space Technology. I960
(June 6), 21. 3*.
DoD strongly opposed legislation which would ban incentive
payments on its contracts unless the manufacturer can "com-
pletely demonstrate" that he hss earned tht'ra. Opposition
was expressed at n-sarinfto before the House Armed S
Committee. (33.62,71,73).
Johnsen, K. McCIellan dirs Incentive contract loRuf. Avlat ion
Week and Space Technology. 1962 (May 28), jte, 36-37.
Strong congressional ooveiTssnt to discourage incentive-type
contracting for new weapons systems, in cases where neither
design specifications or costs are known with accuracy, was
launched last week at hearings of the Senate Permanent In-
vestigative Subcommittee, headed by Sen. John McClellan.
When these (actors are unknown, the contractor may set the
target pric*.<a« high as possible, find earn a high profit by
reducing tnJa unrealistic price in performance. (15,51,
62,71.72,73,75),
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Johnson, K. NASA sole judf.e in Incentive p l a n . Avia t ion Week
and Sp.icc Technology. 1962 (June 25), 76. 28-29.
NASA plans to retain complete discretionary power to decide
whether its contractors should he paid merit p ro f i t s of fees
under its new Incentive-type contract inj» proqram. F.ven the
c r i t e r i a by which contractors' performance wi l l be jjd>>ed
wi l l he d iscre t ionary with NASA. (15 ,34 ,71 ,72 ,73) .
Johnsen, K. Higher incentive rewords, penalt ies due. A v i a t i o n
Wee!; and Space Technology. 1963 (June 3), 7^. 84-85."
UoD intends to increase both rewards for uood performance
and prn.il t i e s for poor performance under incentive-type
cont rac ts . Th i s lu one result of a comprehensive review of
i n c e n t i v e no KOI hit ions l»v the s t a f f of T. D. Morr i s , assis-
tan t secre tary - j f defense for ins ta l l a t ions and logis
, <:, J. New p r o f i t s for the prime. Fortune. 196r; ( A p r i l ) ,
' "'
Tht- new » l > l f r toward incentive contracts has br ight impl ica-
for so-w of thf large aerospace companifo. A few
. ( I S , 71, 73).
M l h l s n , I.. F. Th** tiang^rous hualm&iis of defense- c o n t r a c t i n g .
Arp.uts wither tJ .S . p lant or the pentagon ie f a l l i n g d^wn on
the « le f t ?ns^ ioh. Srtyfe defense busincsii i^ a ilan^en'oua l > u a « -
nc33 -• r n t a i t i n ^ product i t > n , q u a l i t y con t ro l , ove ra l l ifiaua>.:t>
ment . ..-uatuwtir (DuO) r e l r t t i o n e , f»*r &un»«- 1 . and p^pi-rwork.
M a l f u n c t i o n •>!" ony on« of these een c r i p p l e t t te whole . (3!»,
, k . f i . Orh i t e r i& f i r a e hi^ MASA incent ive \ a \ » . Av^iat ton
and S|»ace Techttuljagjr. i9t»J (October ?), j^l. 3i!-33.
tun<ir photographie a rb i te r lo rhe f i r s t red jar NASA project
tha t w i l l i nc lude cen t , de l ivery ami technical per
incent ivrs as pa r t nf te*. contract . ( 7 1 , 7 2 , ? . $ ) .
t
I
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Ramo, S. New incentive contract plan advanced . Aviat ton Week
.ind Space Technology. 1962 (January 8), 76. 99.
Excerpts from n speech by S. Ramo, vice president of Thompson
K.imo Wooltlr luV.c. Since DoD Intends to broaden its use of In-
centive typ<? controc :s nnd hos been critical of industry for
/ its railur«? to provide ."specific contract formulas that would
row«r«l above average performance and penajl/.e poor perform-
ance, S. hitmtt offers a proposal for such a system. (63,71,
, 72,73).
i
Russell, J. R. Attack on incentive system seen in rising debate
on cont-act Ing. Aviation Ween and Space Technology. 1966
(May 23), 84, 119-122.
An excerpt of a speech given by J. R. Russell. Gives warn-
ing chat a new debate over toe value of incentive type con-
tracts is Impending. But criticisms leveled legitimately at
past practices are not necessarily adequate reasons for aban-
doning the incentive principle altogether. (71,72,73).
Steel Air Force zeros in on Its cost-plus contracts. 1962
(December 31). I SI. 16-17.
Greater use of incentive and fixed price contracts Is being
emphasized by DoD. In fiscal 1962, 47 per cent of DoD's
contracts won- the CPFF Type, and DoD wants to get the total
down to 18 per cent in fiscal 196$. (71,72,73).
Steel Kno-cv the pitffllla of govfrntwnt cor-.tr.scts. 1963 (I«ccem-
ber •»). HL V)-
Excerpts of « apeirch by fi . A. Cuneo, t»t the Amorlcnn Market-
inn Association meeting, outlining the Jpy,al pitfalls of gov-
ernment •.•ontrrtcting. (71).
Steel What Defense COGC cut t ing e f f n r f moans. 1963 (December 9),
1 'J3 . 43-/./».
The f i r s t major fnove of the Johnson adminis t ra t ion di rec t ly
l i t i i u t i t r y ta en J n t ? n s L f Ication of cost cut t ing pro- .
nc Dol). Va lue engineering program is b r i e f l y reviewed.
CD.
li ic Keaction :md N'-w* Mc<li;i Reports
Wilson, C. C. Defense to emphasize incentive contracts.
Aviat iun Week and Space Technology. 1V61 (November i!0),
21. 26-27.
f)oD is now ready to write a wide variety of incentive-penalty
contracts with industry. This decision will revolutionize
traditional Jrfensc-industry relationships at the harj-ainini;
l;ihle by shifting the initial cost estimates to means for
measuring and rewarding th«.- contractor's performance. ('33,
34,63,73).
Wilson, (I. C. Defense to stress incentive, competition.
A<» :at- ion Weok .-*nd Soace Technology. 1962 (Aoril 30). 76.
• / » 6 - 2 7 . "
DoD procurement officials have mapped an ambitious economy
campaign f jturing the broadest use yet of incentive con-
tracts as well as a series of actions designed to increase
competition amon^ military contractors. Key elements In the
over-all strategy are more emphasis on the reward or penalty
approach in writing the DoD contracts in the first place and
closer administration of the work after it is started to de-
termine if economies can he introducen along the way. (22,
33,71,72,73).
Incentive- Contracts: Evaluation
ROOK, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. Study of the effectiveness of
NASA Incentive contracts. Vols. 1 & 2. WashinRton: NASA
Headquarters, 1966.
A final report on the effectiveness of NASA incentive con-
tracting. The key findings, conclusions, and recommendations
resulting from 15 case studies are presented in volume 1.
A series of appendixes are provided in volume 2, covering
study methods and procedures, including a procedure for up-
dating the case studies. (71,72,73,102,103,107,112,113).
Incmtivf Contracts: Evaluation 3?
Chfri.in, Edward J. "The Design and Use «if Multidimensional
Incentive's for Government Contracts." Unpublished Ph.D.
disstTtntion, Rensselner Polytechnic Institute, Troy,' New-
York, November 196 5.
Exhaustive1 enipiric.il (statistical) study ol multidimensional
contracts in the Air Force Systems Command and NASA. Major
findings were: contractors receive additional incentive
profits under multidimensional incentive contracts; there
was no significant relationship between incentive fees and
most contract dimensions; and factors other than profit
appear to provide substantial contractor motivation for im-
proved contract results. (13,71,73,112).
Cross, J. A reappraisal ot cost Incentives in defense con-
tracts. Research paper P-282. Institute for Defense Analy-
ses, Economic and Political Studies Division. September,
1966 (Defense Documentation Center, AD 641-021).
Results show cost sharinj; necessitates payment for risk b.-ar-
ing that exceeds possible savings. (13,22,24,25,61,62,73,
74,7^,103,112).
Deavers, K. L., & McCall, J. J. Notes on incentive contracting.
Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1966. (Defense Docu-
mentation Center, AD 641-336).
Finds relation between sharing rate and change from initial
cost not significant. Neither is the change significantly
related to contract size. (25.71,72,73,74,75,103,112).
Department of Defense. Defe.ise Science Board Task Croup. Incen-
tive-type contracting in the procurement of RDT & E. November
L, 1966.
Includes review of purposes and principles in incentive con-
tracts as well as evaluations of them in RDT & E (coordinate
with Rooz-Allen). A survey of II contractors (51,73,102,112)
Egnn, D. M. Experimentation in government procurement: The
award-fee concept. Journal of Purchasing. 1968, 4_, 14-28.
A review of the experience of contractors with award-fee
contracts. Outlines the pitfnlls firms should seek to avoid
if the award-fee concept is to be beneficial to both industry
and government. (63,71,72,73,103,112).
Incentive Contracts: Fv.ilu.ition 33
Fisher, I. N. Cost incentives and contract 'uitcomes: An
empirical analysis. Santa Monica, Calif.: Hand Corporation,
1%6 (Defense Documentation Center, AD 813-866).
The study was undertaken to identify and clarify several
aspects of incentive contracts that influence contract cost
outcomes, and to provide an empirical analysis of cost in-
centive contracts. The results obtained indicate that a
statistically significant relationship exists between the
negotiated profit rate and the sharing rale. (24,73,103,
..12,124).
: ^ sher, I. N. Improving the effectiveness of incentive con-
tracting. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1968
(DeTense Documentation Center, AD 673-332).
This paper identifies the various effects that -incentive
contracts may have on contract costs, and questions the
^ validity of the cost savings commonly attributed to these
contracts. Several possible strategies for improving their
effectiveness are also discussed. (71,73,108,113).
Fisher, I. N. A reappraisal of incentive contracting experience.
Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1968 (Defense Docu-
mentation Center, AD 673-343).
Statistical analysis of 1,007 Air Force contracts for major
weapon systems indicates that while Incentive contracts may
motivate contractors to reduce actual costs, they also en-
courage them to overstate target costs. The evidence indi-
cates that, the underrunt* commonly associated with incentive
contracts ?re not related to the incentive features of the
contract or to improved cost control and efficiency on the
part of the contractor. (12,71,73,107,112).
Glennan, T. K., Jr. Incentives and R&D contracting. Santa
Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1964.
Examines whether or not it is valid to assume that incentive
contracts sensitizes the contractor to short run profits.
Suggests that procurement personnel should try to harness
the long term profit motives of the contractor. (51,52,72,
103,113).
\\
Incentive Contracts: Kvaluation . 16
Hi'l, W. Ob.servnt ioiis on incentive e«~><>t fsf l. "'OK ,
College of Bjsiness Admi niscrnr t on, J>yrj»t'i»t»f
1,966.
A general evaluative discussion of problems nud effects of
incentive contracts. Essentially an anecdotal summary of
procurement theory ;md experience. (13,73,108,111).
Jones, T. H., Jr. A study of selected aspects of the use of
incentive contracts in United States Air Force procurement
management. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State
University, 1967.
A study to determine whether incentives have any statisti-
cally discernible el'tect on contract outcomes. Quantitative
analyses are supplemented by qualitative analyses based on
case studies. (61,62,73,102,103,107,112).
Marcus, S. Studies of the defence contracting process. Law
and Contemporary Problems. 1964, 2^. 19-31.
Some previous studies of the defense contracting process are
analyzed. 'The areas covered include: law and procedure;
actual operations (e.g., CPFF); economic Impact; political
implications. (31,41,6 ,71,72,103,111).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Summary report:
1965-1966 study of NASA incentive contracts. September 15,
1966.
A report of datra collected by Booz, Allen & Hamilton. (73).
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Cost plus award
fee contracting study. August, 22, 1967. (Mimeo).
An interpretative summary of a Roaz, Allen & Hamilton study
prepared by the Procurement Office, NASA Headquarters.
(73,107,112).
Pettit, W. F. The defective pricing law and implementing regu-
lations -- a year and a half later. Law and Contemporary
Problems. 1964, 2_9, 552-565.
Examines the law and implementing regulations; discusses
the manifold problems that have been generated; and suggests
certain avenues of relief which may, over time, make the new
regulations more palatable to government contractors. (33,
34, 71, 72, 10H, 111).
Incentive1 Contracts: Evaluation 35
Sit. John's Law Review. Government contract: its burdens and
hcne-'it. J965, 40, 82-88.
Comments on the government ' s ability to modify its contracts
throuj-.h a "change clause," and the effects of this clause
/ upon the government .ind the private contractor. (63,71,
108,111).
' Williamson, 0. E. Defense contracts: An analysis of adaptive
response. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1965.
A ptl»iH\» oT »~h<? n10 f l"> o<i *» Kv »jh'lr>h «rnto.
keep development contract costs within bounds. The analysis
indicates that the most effective way to strengthen cost con-
trols is to reduce the task uncertainty. (71,75,103,112,113).
Simulations & Experimental Studies: Illustrative Exhibits
Berhold, M. H. An analysis of contractual incentives. Unpub-
lished dortoral dissertation. Los Angeles: University of
California, 1967. (Defense Documentation Center, AD 665-276),
A simulation model of contracting between the government and
•a contractor. -Government contracts are characterized by the
sharing ratio which indicates the proportion of the cost re-
duction which the contractor will receive. The model shows
that under certainty the optimal sharing ratio is 1.
(71,73,105,106,113).
Feeney, G. J., McGlothlin, W. H., & Wolfson, R. J. Risk-aversion
in incentive contracting: an experiment. Santa Monica,
C.ilif.: Rand Corporation, 1964.
Description of an experimental measurement of risk-taking
behavior in a design which approximates certain features of
incentive contracts. It is a preliminary exploration of the
effect of risk on competitive bH*. (13,24,25,26,73,75,
100,105,112).
Simulations & Experimental, -Studies 36
Cumpert, P., Deutschv K., & Epstein, Y. The effect of incen-
tive magnitude on cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
game. Technical Report #7, October 15, 1967.
The present study varied the magnitude of incentives. The
results showed that cooperation tended to decrease over time
in all conditions. The results were interpreted as failing
to support the "insufficient-incentive-to-cooperate criti-
cisms. (11,22,100,112).
Hagen, 0. Risk aversion and incentive contracting. Economic
Record. 1966. 42. 416-429.
A i odel of incentive contract negotiation is presented in
which each party is assumed Co desire maximization of a
utility based on fee or price and its variance. This can
lead to cost sharing contracts that are non-Pareto optimal.
Suggestions are made.for achieving Pareto optinsality.
(13,24,25,26,73,74,75,106,108,113,115).
Hagen, W. A. The structure of a predirected motivation oodel:
Quantifying government objectives to a research and develop-
ment contractor. Unpublished master's thesis, University of
Alabama, 1967.
Presents a motivational model which relates all incentivized
schedule and performance criteria, in incentive contracts,
to equivalent savings rather than to fee. In this way the
government can more clearly decide and communicate the de*
sired trade-offs among objectives to the contractor. (51,
61,71,72,73,106,113).
Hunt, R. G., Hoogerman, D. P., Perry, F. A., Jr. Development
and evaluation of an experimental contracting simulation:
Effects of competition and ability on risk-taking in propo-
sals. Working paper, October 1968 (Prepared under MASA
Grant NGR 33-015-061).
A simulation model was developed to deal with a wide range
of contracting- problems, situations, formats and personnel.
The demonstration provides some evidence cf the practical
success of these endeavors. (11,22,23,71,105^ 112).
Simulations & Experimental Studies 37
i
Livingston, J., & Cravans, J. E. The observatory satellite
system (A mock negotiation case study). Case study pre-
pared for the Workshops in Government Contract Management,
National Contract Management Association, Washington, D.C.,
March 19, 1968.
The case problem reflects current experience of industry
and government departments and agencies in dealing with
various negotiation situations. The practices exhibited
in the mock negotiation case utilize the knowledge and
expertise with techniques gained in previous workshops
which have reviewed contracting principles, contract law,
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